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IN THE UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN ANGELO GARCIA, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20060328-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The State appeals from an order suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a search 
warrant, in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. This Courthas jurisdiction to consider the petition 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)0) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in concluding that defendant had standing to challenge 
the search of the duffle bag when the record does not support a legitimate expectation of 
privacy? 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in failing to determine whether the affidavit used to 
procure a warrant for the search of defendant's apartment was adequate to support probable 
cause even when the tainted evidence of 32 pounds of marijuana is redacted? 
Standards of Review for Both Issues: A trial court's factual findings underlying a 
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v. 
Duran, 2005 UTApp 4094 10> 131 P.3d246. However, the trial court's conclusions of law, 
and its application of the law to the facts, are reviewed under correctness standard, according 
no deference to the trial court. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, Tf 11,103 P.3d 699 (Utah 2004). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and reproduced in pertinent part: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and his brother, Jeremiah Andrew Garcia, were charged by Information 
with two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (psilocin and marijuana) 
with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West 2004); and one count of endangerment of a child, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (West 2004). R. 1-2. 
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial. R. 108. 
By minute order dated March 21, 2006, the court granted defendant's motion to 
suppress after concluding that the search of the duffle bag violated defendant's constitutional 
rights. R. 79; 90-91. 
2 
On March 31,2006, the State filed a motion to dismiss the charges against defendant 
because suppression of the evidence in the duffle bag and other evidence recovered afterward 
pursuant to the search warrant had "substantially impaired the State's case . . . " R. 81. 
The court granted the State's motion by order dated April 3, 2006. R. 82. 
The State timely appealed. R. 93. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The mysterious duffle bag 
When Salt Lake City police officers confronted two suspects leaving the scene of a 
reported robbery, one thing became immediately apparent: They were reluctant to part with a 
large, nylon duffle bag. R. 74 (Affidavit for Search Warrant, dated October 12, 2005), 
Addendum A.1 When officers challenged them, the two men fled back into the apartment 
they were exiting, hauling the duffle bag with them. Id. Moments later, officers again 
encountered one of the suspects climbing out onto a balcony attached to the apartment. Id. 
Once he was outside, someone inside handed out the duffle bag. Id. When officers again 
challenged the suspect, he ducked back inside, leaving the duffle bag on the balcony. Id 
Officers returned to the front door of the apartment and knocked on the door. Id. 
Someone shouted back that everything was "OK." Id. Still, those inside refused to open the 
door. Id. The officers said they needed to come inside to investigate a possible robbery 
reported by a downstairs neighbor who told officers she had seen three males, one wearing a 
1
 The affidavit was also admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 1 during a hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress. 
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ski mask, running away from the apartment. Id. The officers told those inside that they 
would have to force the door open "to verify that everything is ok." Id. The door finally 
swung open. Id. 
Plain smell of marijuana 
Once inside, officers were immediately aware of the smell of burnt marijuana. On a 
sofa, in plain view, was a baggie of marijuana. Id. In a search of the duffle bag left on the 
balcony, officers discovered about 32 pounds of marijuana, as well as psilocybin 
mushrooms. Id. Officers also noticed money stashed behind a mirror that had been knocked 
off the wall near the balcony. Id, 
Officers secured the premises and prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant. 
R. 108:14. The defendant and was arrested and advised of his rights per Miranda. R. 
108:10. Several other people were in the apartment—a 17-year-old girl, her mother and an 
infant. Id. 
After the search warrant was obtained, officers seized the marijuana in the duffle bag 
along with additional controlled substances and miscellaneous paraphernalia. R. 108:6. 
They found a brown box with several grams of mushrooms underneath a bed in what 
appeared to be a child's room. Id. In the closet next to a crib, they found four bags of 
2
 It is unclear from the record whether the duffle bag was open when officers located 
the marijuana. During the preliminary hearing, Detective Lyman Smith of the Salt Lake City 
police department stated that he had been told that the duffle bag was unzipped. R. 108:15. 
However, he acknowledged, in response to questions from defense counsel, that a police 
report prepared by another officer suggested that the officers opened the duffle bag. R. 
108:15. 
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marijuana weighing approximately four pounds. Id. Officers also found a great deal of 
marijuana residue or "shake" covering counter tops in the kitchen, the floor and on top of the 
TV and stereo. R. 108:5. 
During a post-Miranda interview with Detective Lyman Smith, defendant admitted 
the marijuana was his and that he was selling it. R. 108:10-11. Defendant said he sells 
quantities of "a half pound or more. He doesn't do small quantities." R. 108:11. He also 
said that he "only deals with organic material... meaning marijuana and mushrooms, and 
that's the only stuff he'll deal with and sell." Id. 
Duffle bag evidence suppressed 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the duffle bag, R. 
4; 61 -63. He argued that evidence recovered pursuant to the search warrant was "fruit of the 
poisonous tree," because the warrant was based on an unlawful search of the duffle bag. R. 
62. 
On March 20,2006, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. R. 107. 
The State opposed the motion for two reasons. First, defendant had not claimed or 
demonstrated an interest in the duffle bag and, therefore, had no standing to challenge the 
search. R. 65-67; 107:5-7. Second, even assuming the duffle bag was illegally searched, the 
affidavit prepared by Salt Lake police in support of their request for a warrant to search 
defendant's apartment contained sufficient additional information—the smell of burnt 
marijuana and the baggie of green leafy material in plain view on the sofa—to support 
probable cause. R. 67-70. 
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After the court took the State's argument on lack of standing under advisement, R. 
107:7, the State called Detective Doug Teerlink, Salt Lake City P olice Department, to testify 
concerning the circumstances of defendant's arrest and the search of the duffle bag. R. 
107:8. Detective Teerlink, one of several officers who responded to the scene, prepared the 
affidavit for the search warrant for the apartment. R. 107:9. He began to discuss 
information provided from other officers for use in the affidavit when defendant's counsel 
objected to the testimony as hearsay. R. 107:8-9. The court sustained the objection. R. 
107:9.3 
Detective Teerlink then started to recount the circumstances that led to the seizure of 
the marijuana in the duffle bag, but defense counsel once again objected. R. 107:9-l 0. The 
court again sustained the objection. R. 107:10. 
At the hearing's conclusion, the court took the matter under advisement and later 
granted the motion to suppress. The court stated: "The warrantless search of the black duffel 
bag violated [defendant's] rights." R. 91 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated 
April 3,2006), Addendum B. For that reason, "[t]he contents of the duffel bag and all items 
recovered thereafter are fruits of the poisonous tree" and must be suppressed. Id. The court 
also concluded that defendant had standing to challenge the search of the duffle bag. Id. 
3
 The court erred in sustaining the hearsay objection because the rules of evidence do 
not apply in suppression hearings. See, e.g. State v. Clifford, 1999 WL 33244693 (Utah. 
App.) (Memorandum Decision), Addendum C; see also Utah R. Evid. 1101(b)(1) and Utah 
R. Evid. 104(a). "A defendant who wishes to make an evidentiary challenge.. must proceed 
to trial and make the evidentiary challenge there." Id. n. 1. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The trial court erred in determining the defendant had established "standing" 
to challenge the admission of the evidence recovered from the duffle bag. Defendant offered 
no evidence at the suppression hearing, and the record does not demonstrate, that defendant 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the duffle bag. Thus, the court erred in 
determining defendant had Fourth Amendment standing. 
Point II: Even without the 32 pounds of marijuana recovered from the duffle bag, 
the search affidavit provided sufficient information to support probable cause to search 
defendant's apartment. The affidavit stated that officers responding to a report of a 
robbery observed the furtive, evasive behavior of two men who appeared determined to 
elude officers and remove the duffle bag from the apartment. Once officers were 
admitted to the apartment, they immediately smelled burnt marijuana and saw a baggie of 
what appeared to be marijuana sitting on a sofa. Thus, even assuming that the initial 
search of the duffle bag was unlawful and that it cannot be used to support probable 
cause, the search affidavit still contained sufficient information to support probable cause 
for a search of defendant's apartment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD STANDING TO FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE 
CONTENTS OF THE DUFFLE BAG. 
Defendant presented no evidence to support his claim that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the duffle bag and the trial court, accordingly, erred in concluding 
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that defendant had Fourth Amendment standing to contest the recovery of 32 pounds of 
marijuana from the duffle bag. 
"Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional 
rights, may not be vicariously asserted." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,134 (1978); accord 
United States v. Betancur, 24 F.3d 73,76 (10th Cir. 1994); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 64 (Utah 
App. 1990). Accordingly, the exclusionary rule may not redound to the benefit of those who 
have no reasonable interest in the item or place searched. Id. A defendant who moves to 
suppress evidence is required to establish his Fourth Amendment standing. State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 889, 887 (Utah App. 1990). Once the State objects to a defendant's 
"standing" to challenge a search, "[t]he defendant must factually demonstrate that he does 
have standing to contest the warrantless search." Id. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
Evidence is admissible . . .until the accused has established that his rights 
under the rule have been invaded. Therefore, it is entirely proper to require of 
one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search... that he establish that he 
himself was a victim of an invasion of privacy. . . . 
State v. Montayne, 414 P.2d 958, 960 (Utah 1966); accord State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056, 
1057 (Utah App. 1992) (finding that "the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy 
must be established by the party challenging the police conduct."). Indeed, Fourth 
Amendment standing is a "threshold requirement that a defendant must satisfy in order to 
establish a violation of constitutional rights." Atwood, 831 P.2d at 1058. 
To establish Fourth Amendment standing, a defendant must prove that he or she has 
"a legitimate expectation of privacy" in the place or thing searched. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140. 
In addressing whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy, the court 
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determines "first, whether the defendant 'exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy/ and second, whether that subjective expectation is 'one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable."5 Webb, 791 P.2d at 80 (quoting United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 
285 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1019 (1988). Factors relevant to this inquiry include 
whether the defendant had any possessory or proprietary interest in the place searched or the 
item seized; was legitimately on the premises; could exclude others from that place; 
exhibited a subjective expectation that the place would remain free from governmental 
invasion; or took normal precautions to maintain his privacy. Id. 
Establishing Fourth Amendment standing to contest the search of a residence does not 
necessarily mean a defendant has standing to contest the search of items or containers inside 
the residence. See, e.g., Webb, 790 P.2d at 83 (defendant lacked standing to challenge search 
of wife's purse). "A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through 
the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or 
property has not had any of his fourth amendment rights infringed." Id. (citing Rakas, 439 
U.S. at 134). 
The trial court ruled defendant had standing to challenge the search of the duffle bag. 
R. 91. This conclusion is premised on the apparent factual finding that defendant lived at the 
apartment that was searched pursuant to the warrant. See R. 90 ("Salt Lake City officers 
entered the apartment of Mr. Garcia"). However, there was no evidence introduced at the 
suppression hearing to indicate that defendant lived at the apartment. Nor was there any 
evidence to suggest defendant owned the duffle bag. Thus, defendant has not met the 
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threshold requirement to establish that he has standing to challenge the search of the duffle 
bag or, for that matter, the apartment. See Webb, 790 P.2d at 80 (defendant testifies at 
suppression hearing for limited purpose of establishing residence and standing to bring 
motion). 
Defendant could have offered evidence that he lived at the apartment. At defendant's 
preliminary hearing, Detective Lyman Smith testified that he interviewed defendant 
following his arrest and that defendant stated that he rented a room at the apartment. R. 4 
(Information; Probable Cause Statement, signed by Detective D. Findlay, dated October 18, 
2005); see also R. 20 (jail booking sheet with defendant's address). Defendant also said he 
was "staying in the north bedroom," R. 108:6, although it appears that the defendant's 
brother is the primary renter. R. 108:10. 
However, the evidence that might support a claim that defendant had an interest in the 
duffle bag is tenuous at best. The record indicates that the balcony where the duffle bag 
came to rest was connected to the bedroom where defendant had been staying. R. 108:7. 
Defendant also told Detective Smith that the "marijuana was his and didn't belong to 
anybody else but him." R. 108:10. Defendant said he sold quantities of "a half pound or 
more. He doesn't do small quantities." R. 108:11. He also said that he "only deals with 
organic material... meaning marijuana and mushrooms, and that's the only stuff he'll deal 
with and sell." Id. 
Thus, by his own admission, defendant clearly has an interest in at least some of the 
marijuana. But his statements do not establish that he had an interest in the duffle bag, 
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which could have belonged to him, his brother, his brother's wife, or perhaps even the wife's 
mother, all of whom were present in the apartment when police entered. R. 108:9-10. This is 
insufficient to establish standing. Even if the meager evidence from defendant's statements 
that he stayed at the apartment were sufficient to establish standing to contest the search of 
the apartment, there is no evidence establishing that defendant had a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the duffle bag. See, e.g., Webb, 790 P.2d at 83. Without more, defendant has 
not shown that he had standing to challenge the search and the trial court's conclusion is, 
thus, erroneous. 
II. EVEN WITHOUT THE EVIDENCE FROM THE DUFFLE 
BAG, POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO PROCURE A 
SEARCH WARRANT. 
Even assuming the trial court was correct in finding Fourth Amendment standing, the 
court erred in failing to consider whether the search warrant affidavit was sufficient without 
the duffle bag evidence. This error is fatal to the trial court's ruling and requires reversal or, 
at minimum, remand to consider whether the redacted search affidavit provides probable 
cause for the warrant. 
The "core rationale" behind the exclusionary rule and the suppression of evidence is 
"that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from 
violations of constitutional and statutory protections." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 
(1984). However, the deterrence rationale serves no purpose when "the prosecution can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably 
would have been discovered by lawful means." Id. at 444. The Nix court explained that 
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admitting otherwise tainted evidence is fair because the State gains no advantage and 
defendant suffers no prejudice. See id. at 447. "Indeed, suppression of the evidence would 
operate to undermine the adversary system by putting the State in a worse position than it 
would have occupied without any police misconduct." Id. 
When a defendant challenges the legality of evidence included in an affidavit 
submitted to support probable cause for a search warrant, the defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986,); see also Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). To successfully challenge the validity of a search made 
pursuant to a warrant, the defendant must establish (1) the affidavit supporting the warrant 
contains a false statement by the affiant made intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly and (2) 
the affidavit is insufficient to support probable cause once the misstatement is removed. Id. 
(citing Franks, 483 U.S. at 171-72). As the Utah Supreme Court put it: 
The obvious purpose of Franks and its progeny is to avoid suppressing 
evidence when the actual facts, if known to the magistrate, would have 
resulted in a finding of probable cause. Deterrence of police misconduct is 
not to be a factor in the decision to suppress unless the misconduct materially 
affects the finding of probable cause. 
Id. 
Courts have construed the Franks requirement to apply to the use of illegally obtained 
evidence, which must also be excluded from consideration of the warrant's sufficiency. 
"[W]hen faced with a warrant containing information obtained pursuant to an illegal search, 
a reviewing court must excise the offending information and evaluate whether what remains 
is sufficient to establish probable cause." United States v. Dessesaure, 429 F.3d 359,367 (1st 
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Cir. 2006); accord United States v. Jenkins, 396 F.3d 751, 758-59 (6th Cir.2005). 
("[Ajuthority from this and other circuits, as well as the principles underlying the Murray 
rule, support an interpretation of the independent source rule that incorporates consideration 
of the sufficiency of the untainted affidavit to see if probable cause exists without the tainted 
information.") (citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)); United States v. 
Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964, 970 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he district court should consider whether 
the warrant affidavit, once purged of tainted facts and conclusions, contains sufficient 
evidence to constitute probable cause for issuance of the warrant"); State v. Bilant, 36 P.3d 
883, 889, f 26 (Mont. 2001) ("When a search warrant is based, in part, on illegally obtained 
information, the reviewing court shall excise the illegal evidence from the application and 
review the remaining information de novo to determine whether probable cause supported 
the issuance."). 
Thus, if a trial court concludes that some of the evidence in the search warrant 
affidavit was improperly included, then it must proceed to the second part of the Franks test 
and determine whether the remaining untainted evidence in the search affidavit may still 
establish probable cause. Here, the trial court never performed the second step in the Franks 
analysis. Despite the urging of the State, R. 68-69, the court granted the motion to suppress 
the evidence without considering whether the affidavit established probable cause absent the 
allegedly tainted evidence. Had the court performed that test, the result in this case would 
have been different. The affidavit in support of the search warrant recounts the officers' 
discovery of the plain smell of freshly burnt marijuana as well as "a baggie of a green leafy 
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substance in plain view on a couch." R. 74. This discovery was preceded by the report of a 
robbery and the furtive, evasive behavior of the two men who apparently attached great 
importance to the duffle bag, which they were desperately attempting to remove from the 
apartment. Id.; see State v. Church, 2002 WL 31840887 (Del. Super. Ct), (suspect's 
backpack deemed "suspicious" by police because drug traffickers transport large quantities 
of marijuana in duffle bags, backpacks, trash bags, and cardboard boxes) Addendum C. If 
the trial court had properly reviewed the redacted warrant, it would have or at least should 
have concluded that the officers had probable cause for the search. State v. South, 885 P.2d 
795, 800 (Utah App. 1994) (smell of burnt marijuana emanating from a home provides 
officers with probable cause to seek a warrant), rev yd on other grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 
1996); State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, \ 22, 131 P.3d 246 (smell of burning marijuana 
provides probable cause, but not exigent circumstances, so officers must seek a warrant); see 
also Bilant, 36 P.3d at 889, ^ 28 (Mont. 2001) (investigative subpoena for defendant's 
medical records supported by probable cause, despite officer's illegal phone inquiry to 
defendant9 s medical provider, because defendant admitted at accident scene that he had been 
drinking and had taken prescription medication); State v. Beeken, 585 N.W.2d 865, 874 
(Neb. App. 1998) (mention in search affidavit of discovery of "roach clip" during illegal 
search did not invalidate search warrant, which was amply supported by probable cause 
without the roach clip); seePeoplev. Cohen, 496 N.E.2d 1231,1234(111. App. 1986) (trained 
officer detecting odor of burnt marijuana establishes probable cause of substance's 
presence); cf. United States v. Shamaezideh, 80 F.3d 1131, 1139 (6th Cir. 1996) (when 
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information gleaned from illegal search excised, statement from upstairs resident that "other 
occupants of the house were growing marijuana" did not support probable cause for search 
of basement apartment). 
In short, the trial court committed reversible error in failing to conduct a proper 
Franks analysis to determine if the redacted affidavit supported probable cause to search 
defendant's apartment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court reverse the trial court's suppression order, first, 
because the court erred in concluding defendant had Fourth Amendment standing and, 
second, because the search affidavit supported probable cause despite the illegal search of 
the duffle bag. Alternatively, this Court should remand with instructions to the trial court to 
conduct a Franks inquiry to determine if the affidavit supported probable cause 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of October, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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the foregoing to: 
Joan C. Watt 
Steven Shapiro 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Addendum A 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah. 
Proof by Affiant under oath having been made this day before me by Detective Doug 
Teerlink, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe: 
That your affiant has reason to believe that on the premises known as 1703 South 700 
East apartment C, further described as a triplex constructed of grey brick with white trim. 
The structure is located on the southeast comer of 1700 South 700 East and the front of 
the triplex faces to the west. The numbers 1703 are clearly above the front porch of the 
triplex in black letters. There are stairs leading from the front porch up to apartment C. 
The stairs are located on the south side of the structure. The letter C is printed on the 
north side of the stairs and is black in color. The door to apartment number C is located 
at the top of the stairs, it is white in color and faces to the south. And all rooms, attics, 
and other parts therein and the surrounding grounds and any garages, storage rooms, and 
out buildings of any kind located upon the curtilage of the complex which are designated 
for the use of apartment C. 
In the City of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, There is now certain property or evidence 
described as: 
Marijuana, further described as a green leafy substance; material related to the possession 
or distribution of marijuana including bags, scales, measuring devices; and drug 
paraphernalia described as rolling papers or pipes used for smoking marijuana. 
Articles of personal property tending to establish and document sales of a controlled 
substance including U.S. currency, buyer and seller lists, and other documentation of 
sales of a controlled substance; articles tending to establish the identity of persons in 
control of the premises sought to be searched including rent receipts, utility receipts, and 
addressed envelopes, and any other fruits or instrumentality's of the crimes of possession 
or distribution of a controlled substance. 
And that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
or has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the 
purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of 
an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal 
conduct 
You are therefore commanded at anytime day or night (good cause having been shown) 
to make a search of the above described premises for the hereinabove described property 
or evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it before me at the Third 
District Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property in your 
custody, subject to the order of this court. 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That your affiant has reason to believe that on the premises known as 1703 South 700 East 
apartment C, further described as a triplex constructed of grey brick with white trim. The 
structure is located on the southeast corner of 1700 South 700 East and the front of the triplex 
faces to the west. The numbers 1703 are clearly above the front porch of the triplex in black 
letters. There are stairs leading from the front porch up to apartment C. The stairs are located on 
the south side of the structure. The letter C is printed on the north side of the stairs and is black 
in color. The door to apartment number C is located at the top of the stairs, it is white in color 
and faces to the south. And all rooms, attics, and other parts therein and the surrounding grounds 
and any garages, storage rooms, and out buildings of any kind located upon the curtilage of the 
complex which are designated for the use of apartment C. 
In the City of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, There is now certain property or evidence described 
as: 
Marijuana, further described as a green leafy substance; material related to the possession or 
distribution of marijuana including bags, scales, measuring devices; and drug paraphernalia 
described as rolling papers or pipes used for smoking marijuana. 
Articles of personal property tending to establish and document sales of a controlled substance 
including U.S. currency, buyer and seller lists, and other documentation of sales of a controlled 
substance; articles tending to establish the identity of persons in control of the premises sought to 
be searched including rent receipts, utility receipts, and addressed envelopes, and any other fruits 
or instrumentality's of the crimes of possession or distribution of a controlled substance. 
And that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has 
been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it 
as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes 
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WAraLkNT 
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Your affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime(s) of 
Distribution and Possession of a Controlled Substance. 
THE FACTS TO ESTABLISH THE GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH 
WARRANT ARE: 
Your affiant is a Salt Lake City Police Officer and has been a police officer for over 5 years. 
Your affiant is currently assigned to the Salt Lake City Police Department's Narcotic Unit and 
investigates narcotic related offenses. Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and 
in the investigation of narcotic related offenses through the Utah Police Academy and the 
California Narcotics Association. Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA 
Clandestine Laboratory Course. Your affiant has worked street level drug interdiction as an 
arresting officer and as an undercover police officer. Your affiant has seen several different types 
of narcotics during these operations. Your affiant has been involved with over 300 drug related 
cases, many of which were felonies. 
Your affiant has reason to believe that the individuals who reside or otherwise occupy 1703 
South 700 East apartment C are engaging in a narcotics distribution operation. 
On the evening of October 11, 2005 Salt Lake City Police Officers responded to the listed 
apartment on a possible robbery in progress call. The female complaint was at the listed address 
in apartment A. Apartment A is below apartment C. She said that she heard people upstairs in 
the above apartment. She then saw three males leaving apartment C and running away. One of 
males was wearing a ski mask. When Police Officers arrived a short time later, they heard 
yelling coming from the listed apartment. The Officers then saw a male adult coming out of the 
listed apartment. He was wearing a stocking cap and carrying a duffel bag. Police Officer 
challenged the male and he ran back into the apartment. Police Officers knocked on the 
apartment door and the persons inside said everything is ok but they would not open the door. 
Police Officers then observed the male who was carrying the duffel bag go out the back door 
onto a balcony. Someone from inside the apartment handed the male the duffel bag. Police 
Officers challenge the male again. The male dropped the duffel bag and went back into the 
apartment. Police Officer told the persons inside the apartment that they needed to come in and 
verify that everything is ok. Officers told the persons in the apartment to open the door or they 
would kick it in. The persons inside the apartment then let the police into the apartment. 
The Police Officers who went into the apartment could smell a strong smell of fresh burnt 
marijuana in the apartment. They observed a small baggie of a green leafy substance in plain 
view on a couch. Officers found that duffel bag the male dropped on the balcony contained large 
amounts of a green leafy substance that appears to be marijuana. The Officers also observed that 
a mirror had been knocked off the wall near the balcony had some money hidden behind it. 
Your affiant desires to enter 1703 South 700 East and search for marijuana, marijuana 
paraphernalia and other items related to the distribution of marijuana. The paraphernalia 
includes such items as pipes, bongs, rolling papers or tubes used to inhale or smoke marijuana. 
Other related items include packaging material used to package marijuana and scales used to 
weigh quantities. Your affiant knows from training and experience that these items are almost 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WAxulANT 
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always found on the premises where search warrants for controlled substances have been 
executed. 
Your affiant desires to search for records of marijuana sales, both written and electronic, 
residency papers and U.S. currency. Your affiant knows from past experiences with narcotic 
investigations that persons sometimes record their sales to show dates, amounts purchased and 
drug indebtedness. Your affiant knows from training and experience that marijuana is sold for 
money or stolen property. 
This application for search warrant has been reviewed and approved for presentation to the court 
by Deputy District Attorney
 m 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items 
any time day or night because there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good reasons to wit: 
Police Officers are currently securing the listed apartment until the search warrant is written and 
signed. 
Detective Doug Teerlink 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this \Z^ day of 
OrhW^ 2005. {$'&***» 
^ 
Addendum B 
STEVEN G. SHAPIRO (#6330) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
MR - 5 2QQB 
SALTL 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN ANGELO GARCIA, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo.051907326FS 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
This matter having come before the Court for argument on March 20, 2006, the Court 
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
Findings of Fact 
1. On October 12, 2005, Salt Lake City Police officers entered the apartment of Mr. 
Garcia. 
2. Officers located and searched a large black duffel bag which contained a large quantity 
of marijuana without first having obtained a search warrant. 
3. Officers immediately thereafter requested and obtained a search warrant for the 
apartment. 
4. Additional evidence was located pursuant to the subsequent search. 
1 
Conclusions of Law 
Based on the facts as determined above, the Court makes the following Conclusions of 
Law: 
1. Mr. Garcia has standing to contest the search of the black bag as the bag was located 
inside his residence. 
2. The warrantless search of the black duffel bag violated Mr. Garcia's rights under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
3. The contents of the black duffel bag and all items recovered thereafter are fruits of the 
poisonous tree and must accordingly be suppressed. 
4. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is Granted. 
q\ 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District 
'A Attorney, 1111 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this JM-^day of March, 2006. 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently 
available. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK 
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Superior Court of Delaware. 
STATE of Delaware 
v. 
Khyon E. CHURCH, Defendant. 
No. 0104008667. 
Submitted Oct. 21,2002. 
Decided Dec. 18,2002. 
Upon Defendant's Consolidated Motion to 
Supress £M&ence Denied. 
Joelle M. Wright, Deputy Attorney General, 
New Castle County, State of Delaware, for 
the State of Delaware. 
Joseph A, Hurley, for Defendant. 
ORDER 
ABLEMAN, J. 
*1 This is the Court's decision on a 
Consolidated Motion to Suppress Evidence 
seized during a search of Khyon E. Church's 
("Defendant") residence located at 6 S. Gray 
Avenue, Wilmington, Delaware. Following 
the search, which was incident to a warrant, 
Defendant was charged by a Grand Jury 
indictment with numerous drug and 
weapons offenses including, Trafficking, in 
Cocaine and Possession of a Firearm During 
the Commission of a Felony.— Defendant 
submits that the evidence should be 
suppressed because the affidavit in support 
of the search warrant lacked probable cause 
to support a search of the 6 S. Gray Avenue 
premises. Specifically, Defendant claims 
that the affidavit failed to establish a nexus 
between the items sought and the 
Defendant's residence, thereby violating his 
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, § 
6 of the Delaware Constitution. As will be 
discussed more fully hereafter, since the 
four corners of the affidavit meet the 
probable cause standard for the issuance of a 
search warrant, the Consolidated Motion to 
Suppress is denied. 
FN1. On May 15, 2001, Defendant 
was indicted on the following 
offenses: Trafficking in Marijuana in 
violation of Title 16, § 4753(a)(1)(a) 
of the Delaware Code; Trafficking in 
Cocaine in violation of Title 16, § 
4753A(a)(2)(a) of the Delaware 
Code; Possession With Intent to 
Deliver a Non-Narcotic Schedule I 
Controlled Substance in violation of 
Title 16, § 4752 of the Delaware 
Code; Possession with Intent to 
Deliver a Narcotic Schedule II 
Controlled Substance in violation of 
Title 16, $ 4751 of the Delaware 
Code; Possession of a Firearm 
during the Commission of a Felony 
in violation of Title 11, § 1447A of 
the Delaware Code; Use of a 
Dwelling for Keeping Controlled 
Substances (1725 W. 2nd Street) in 
violation of Title 16, § 4755(a)(5) of 
&e Delaware Crate/, Use of & 
Dwelling for Keeping Controlled 
Substances (6 S. Gray Avenue) in 
violation of Title 16, $ 4755(a)(5) of 
the Delaware Code; Use of a Vehicle 
for Keeping Controlled Substances 
in violation of Title 16, § 4755(a)(5) 
of the Delaware Code; Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia in violation of 
Title 16, § 4771 of the Delaware 
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Code; Possession of a Controlled 
Substance Within 300 Feet of a Park 
or Recreation Area in violation of 
Title 16, $ 4768 of the Delaware 
Code. 
Statement of Facts 
During the first week of March 2001, 
Officers Vincent Jordan and Hector 
Cuadrado of the City of Wilmington Police 
Department were contacted by a past proven 
reliable informant who advised them that a 
black male, known only as "Ky," was 
selling large amounts of marijuana from his 
dwelling at 1725 W. 2nd Street in the City of 
Wilmington. The officers then contacted the 
security division of Conectiv Power and 
learned that the utilities for 1725 W. 2nd 
Street were registered in the name of Khyon 
E. Church. Checks for driver's license, social 
security number, and Department of Motor 
Vehicles photographic identification 
confirmed these connections. Although the 
Department of Motor Vehicles identified 
Defendant's registered address as 2 
Commonwealth Boulevard, New Castle, 
Delaware, the social security number 
associated with the driver's license matched 
the social security number in the records of 
Conectiv Power. Thus, the identification 
investigation results all positively matched 
the Defendant with the premises located at 
1725 W. 2nd Street. 
Based on the foregoing information, the 
officers commenced surveillance of 1725 W. 
2nd Street during the fourth week of March 
2001. While conducting surveillance, the 
officers observed a black male whom they 
believed to be the Defendant leave the 
premises with another unknown male who 
was carrying a backpack. Both males 
entered a dark colored 1994 Lexus and 
proceeded to 6 S. Gray Avenue. The police 
officers' experience led them to be 
suspicious since drug traffickers transport 
large quantities of marijuana in duffle bags, 
backpacks, trash bags, and cardboard 
boxes.— The officers responded to 6 S. 
Gray Avenue and observed Defendant walk 
to the front door, check his mailbox, and use 
a key to open the front door and enter the 
premises. The officers conducted a 
registration check on the Lexus and learned 
that the vehicle was registered to William R. 
Church of 2 Commonwealth Boulevard, 
New Castle, Delaware, the same address 
listed on Defendant's driver's license. 
FN2. Suppression Hearing 
Transcript, dated October 15, 2001, 
at 7 (hereinafter, Suppression Hr'g 
Tr.at ."). 
*2 The officers continued the surveillance, 
observing the Defendant leave 6 S. Gray 
Avenue and return to the Lexus still 
occupied by the unknown male passenger. 
Defendant and his passenger proceeded in 
the Lexus to Up the Creek Restaurant. At 
this juncture, undercover Detective Henry 
Cannon of the Wilmington City Police 
continued the surveillance. Detective 
Cannon entered the restaurant and observed 
the Defendant and his passenger seated at a 
table conversing with a white male whom 
Detective Cannon believed was an employee 
of the restaurant. At one point, Defendant 
and the unidentified white male left the 
table, entered the restroom, and returned 
shortly thereafter. Since the two remained in 
the restroom for such a short span of time, it 
was Detective Cannon's belief that a drug 
transaction had occurred in the restroom. 
Not long after, Defendant and his passenger 
drove away in the Lexus. The officers 
followed the Lexus into the center of 
Wilmington but lost sight of the vehicle. 
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Later that evening, the officers again 
conducted surveillance at 6 S. Gray Avenue 
and observed Defendant's parked Lexus. 
From all these circumstances, the officers 
reasonably believed that Defendant was 
residing at 6 S. Gray Avenue. 
During the same week in March 2001, the 
officers conducted further surveillance at 6 
S. Gray Avenue and observed a black 
Nissan pickup truck parked in the rear 
driveway of the premises. The officers 
performed an identification check on the 
license plate number of the truck and found 
it was registered to a William R. Church and 
Erna Church of 2 Commonwealth 
Boulevard, New Castle, Delaware. This is 
the same address noted on Defendant's 
driver's license. The officers continued 
surveillance of 6 S. Gray Avenue on a daily 
basis throughout the remainder of March of 
2001 and observed both the Lexus and the 
pickup truck parked at the premises. 
Surveillance continued into April. The 
officers again observed Defendant leave 6 S. 
Gray Avenue, enter the pickup truck, and 
drive to a dwelling at 1725 W. 2nd Street, 
which he entered. On April 12, 2001, 
officers viewed Defendant arrive at 6 S. 
Gray Avenue in the pickup truck and unload 
a motorcycle from the bed of the pickup 
truck. Shortly thereafter, Defendant drove 
from 6 S. Gray Avenue in the pickup truck 
to the area of Second and Scott Streets. 
Defendant parked the vehicle and carried 
two large black duffel bags into 1725 W. 2nd 
Street. The officers could tell that the bags 
were empty since they were lying flat on 
Defendant's shoulder. Approximately fifteen 
minutes later, Defendant was observed 
leaving the premises with the bags, which 
now appeared filled and heavy. Defendant 
placed the bags in the back of the pickup 
truck. The officers, accompanied by 
Detective Thomas Dempsey, were in an 
unmarked car and not in uniform. 
According to his testimony, Detective 
Vincent Jordan parked his unmarked vehicle 
in a space directly behind Defendant's 
pickup truck, in such a manner that it did not 
obstruct Defendant's vehicle from 
leaving.— Detective Jordan observed a 
minivan parked in front of Defendant's 
vehicle, but there was sufficient room 
between the front of Defendant's vehicle and 
the rear of the minivan for Defendant to 
maneuver his vehicle out of its parking 
space. 
FN3. Suppression Hr'g Tr. at 16. 
*3 Detective Jordan approached Defendant's 
pickup truck, knocked on the window and 
identified himself as a police officer. At the 
time, Detective Jordan was wearing his 
Wilmington Police identification badge 
around his neck. Detective Dempsey was 
also dressed in plain clothes, and neither he 
nor Detective Jordan were displaying their 
weapons. At the moment Detective Jordan 
identified himself, it appeared that 
Defendant pressed the speed dial button on 
his cellular phone and then placed the phone 
on the floor of the vehicle. Detective Jordan 
believed that Defendant was attempting to 
warn someone on the line that he was being 
approached. Detective Jordan requested that 
Defendant step down from the vehicle at 
which point the Detective reached into the 
vehicle, picked up the phone, and could hear 
another male's voice on the phone asking 
what was going on.— The Detective closed 
the flip top phone and asked the names of 
Defendant and the owner of the vehicle. 
Defendant responded that his name was 
Khyon Church and that the pickup truck 
belonged to his father. When questioned as 
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to his destination, Defendant responded that 
he was "going on a trip." — When asked 
about the contents of the duffel bags, 
Defendant replied that they "contained 
clothing for his trip." EH^ 
FN4. Suppression Hr'g Tr. at 18. 
FN5. Id. 
FN6. Suppression Hr'g Tr. at 19. 
After questioning Defendant a second and 
third time about the contents of the duffel 
bags, Defendant stated that the bags 
contained drugs, specifically marijuana.— 
Defendant was detained and handcuffed. 
Defendant's vehicle, and the bags which 
were still in it, were transported to the 
Wilmington central police station. Detective 
Sutton of the K-9 Unit performed a canine 
search of the bags. The dog was alerted to 
the scent of marijuana. Once opened, the 
bags were found to contain a combined 
quantity of approximately 24.99 pounds of 
marijuana. Defendant was read his Miranda 
rights and arrested. 
FN7. Id. 
Upon Defendant's arrest, the officers applied 
for a search warrant for both 1725 W. 2nd 
Street and 6 S. Gray Avenue, believing there 
to be more marijuana plants, drugs, drug 
monies, paraphernalia and other contraband 
at these premises. At the time the search 
warrant was issued, the police officers had 
reason to believe that the Defendant was 
actually living at 6 S. Gray Avenue and that 
he was probably using 1725 W. 2nd Street as 
a stash house for his drugs and for the 
proceeds from the sale of drugs. After 
executing the search warrant at 1725 W. 2nd 
Street, the officers uncovered approximately 
30 pounds of marijuana and two handguns. 
The search warrant completed at 6 S. Gray 
Avenue produced approximately 24 grams 
of powdered cocaine and another handgun. 
A hearing on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress was conducted on October 7, 2002. 
— At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
Court denied Defendant's motion with 
respect to all claims, but reserved decision 
on the issue of the evidence found at 6 S. 
Gray Avenue. On October 22, 2002, the 
State filed its response in opposition to the 
suppression of the evidence recovered from 
the 6 S. Gray Avenue residence. 
FN8. Defendant initially filed his 
Motion to Suppress on June 20, 2001 
and then filed an Amended Motion 
to Suppress on September 25, 2001. 
At the suppression hearing originally 
held on October 15, 2001, the Court 
denied Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress based solely on the 
statement of facts and law contained 
in the initial Motion to Suppress. As 
the Court and the State were not 
made aware of Defendant's 
Amended Motion to Suppress at the 
time of the suppression hearing, the 
Court was unable to address all of 
the pending issues. Accordingly, the 
Court vacated the order denying the 
Motion to Suppress entered on 
October 15, 2001. Defendant 
subsequently filed the instant motion 
on December 6, 2001 and submitted 
a memorandum of law in support of 
motion to suppress evidence on May 
7, 2002. 
Defense Contentions 
*4 Defendant contends that the search of 6 
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S. Gray Avenue violated his Federal and 
State constitutional rights insofar as the 
information obtained from his primary 
detention was tainted. Therefore, Defendant 
argues, all references to information 
gathered because of that illegal action 
represents "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
Additionally, Defendant maintains that the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant 
lacked the necessary probable cause to 
support a reasonable belief that evidence 
would be found at the 6 S. Gray Avenue 
premises. 
Standard Of Review 
On motions to suppress evidence presented 
to this Court, the defendant bears the burden 
of establishing that the challenged search or 
seizure violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights. — Further, it is the defendant who 
must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he is entitled to relief.2^ 
FN9. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
130 n. 1 (1978); State v.. Bien-Aime, 
Del.Super., Cr. A. No. IK92-08-
0326, Toliver, J. (Mar. 17, 1993) 
(Mem.Op.). 
FN 10. Bien-Aime at 3 (citing United 
States v. Casteneda, 951 F.2d 44, 48 
£5thCirJ992)). 
Discussion 
The protections afforded in the Fourth 
Amendment safeguard the public against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and 
require that a search warrant may be issued 
only upon a showing of probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation. ^ ^ The 
Delaware Constitution ensures the same 
fundamental right and security for its 
citizenry by requiring a showing of probable 
cause before issuance of a search warrant 
affidavit upon oath or affirmation.2^ The 
probable cause provision was integrated into 
the present Delaware Constitution and 
Declaration of Rights in 1792 and has never 
been altered.2^ The addition of the 
probable cause provision in 1792 by the 
framers of Delaware's Declaration of Rights 
was more than an integral adjunct to the oath 
requirement for search warrants. It proved to 
be an invaluable enhancement of the right 
against illegal searches and seizures rights 
set forth in Delaware's 1776 Constitution 
and Declaration of Rights.2^ 
FN11. The Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. U.S. Const, 
amend. XIV. 
FN 12. Article 1, § 6 of the Delaware 
Constitution provides: 
Section 6. The people shall be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and 
possessions, from unreasonable 
searches and seizures; and no 
warrant to search any place, or to 
seize any person or thing, shall issue 
without describing them as 
particularly as may be; nor then, 
unless there be probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation. 
Del. Const, art. U 6. 
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FN13. Dorsev v. State, 761 A.2d 
807, 817 (Del.2000); see also Jones 
v. State, 745 A.2d 856 (Del 1999) In 
Jones, the Delaware Supreme Court 
concluded that the history of the 
search and seizure provisions in the 
Delaware Constitution imparted 
different and broader protections 
than those afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 865-66. 
FN14. Dorsev, 761 A.2d at 817. 
In furtherance of the guarantee of protection 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
our General Assembly has set forth in § 
2306 and § 2307 of the Delaware Code the 
statutory requirements that are necessary for 
a constitutionally adequate showing of 
probable cause. The language of § 2306 of 
Title 11 provides that the affidavit in support 
of a search warrant: 
[S]hall designate the house, place, 
conveyance or person to be searched and the 
owner or occupant thereof (if any), and shall 
describe the things or persons sought as 
particularly as may be, and shall 
substantially allege the cause for which the 
search is made or the offense committed by 
or in relation to the persons or things 
searched for, and shall state that the 
complainant suspects that such persons or 
things are concealed in the house, place, 
conveyance or person designated and shall 
recite the facts upon which such suspicion is 
founded.1^1 
FN15. UDel. C. § 2306. 
Delaware courts have interpreted the 
probable cause standard of $ 2306 to 
require that the underlying affidavit in 
support of the search warrant must establish 
sufficient cause for the warrant's 
issuance.^^ The Delaware Supreme Court 
"has eschewed a hypertechnical approach to 
the evaluation of the search warrant affidavit 
in favor of a common-sense interpretation. " 
^ ^ More importantly, "the affidavit 
supporting the search warrant must be 
'considered as a whole and not on the basis 
of separate allegations." ' ^ ^ 
FN16. Wilson v. State, 314 A.2d 905, 
906-907(061.1973) (citing Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)). 
FN 17. United States v. Ventresca, 
380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965); see also 
Gardner v. State, 567 A.2d 404, 409 
(Del. 1989); Jensen v. State, 482 
A.2d 105, 111 (Del. 1984); Pier son v. 
State, 338 A.2d 571, 573-74 
(Del. 1975); Edwards v. State, 320 
A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1974); Wilson v. 
State, 314 A.2d 905, 906-907 
(Del. 1973); (emphasis added). 
FN18. Gardner, 567 A.2d at 409 
(quoting Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d at 
111) (emphasis added). Accord 
Dorsev, 761 A.2d at 811-812 
(upholding the four corners test for 
probable cause required by 11 Del. 
C. § 2306 in that the four corners of 
the affidavit must comport with £ 
2306fs requirement that the 
complaint 'recite the facts' regarding 
why the items sought would be 
found at the place to be searched); 
Dunfee v. State, 346 A.2d 173, 175 
(Del. 1975) (stating that the factual 
sufficiency of an affidavit is tested 
by considering it as a whole and not 
in terns of its isolated component 
allegations); Edwards, 320 A.2d at 
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703 (noting that when testing for 
requirements, the affidavit must be 
considered as a whole, and not in an 
isolated seriatim fashion); Rossitto v. 
State, 234 A.2d 438, 439-40 
(Del. 1967) (holding that allegations 
of an affidavit filed in support of an 
application for a search warrant may 
not be isolated each from the other. 
The affidavit must be considered as a 
whole); Mezzatesta v. State, 166 
A.2d 433. 437 (Del. 1960) 
(articulating that the affidavit must 
be considered as a whole in 
determining if the allegations justify 
the issuing of a search warrant). 
*5 In issuing a search warrant, a judicial 
officer must comply with the procedural and 
substantive requirement of § 2307 as 
follows: 
If the judge, justice of the peace or other 
magistrate finds that the facts recited in the 
complaint constitute probable cause for the 
search, that person may direct a warrant to 
any proper officer or to any other person by 
name for service. The warrant shall 
designate the house, place, conveyance or 
person to be searched, and shall describe the 
things or persons sought as particularly as 
possible...¥jm 
FN19. UDelC. § 2307. 
This Court has held that the foregoing two 
statutory sections establish a four corners 
test for probable cause.^^ There must exist 
adequate facts on the face of the affidavit so 
that a reviewing court can verify that 
probable cause existed for issuance of the 
warrant.2^1 It is the duty of a reviewing 
court to give c great deference' to the 
magistrate's or judge's determination that a 
warrant is supported by probable cmseP^ 
Additionally, there is the requirement that 
all facts relied upon by the magistrate be in 
the written affidavit to insure that the 
reviewing Court may determine whether the 
constitutional requirements have been met 
without reliance upon faded and often 
confused memories/ 
c 
FN20. Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 
571, 573 (Del.1975). 
FN21.M 
FN22. United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (quoting 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 
410,419(1969)). 
FN23. Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 
807, 811 (Del.2000) (quoting 
Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 571, 574 
(Del. 1975)); Henry v. State, 373 
A.2d 575, 577 (Del. 1977). 
It is firmly established that the reviewing 
court must determine whether a search 
warrant affidavit contained sufficient factual 
information when issued by a neutral and 
detached magistrate or judicial officer to 
form a reasonable belief that an offense has 
been committed and that seizable property 
would be found in a particular place or on a 
particular person.2^- In other words, "[t]he 
critical element in a reasonable search is not 
that the owner of the property is suspected 
of a crime but that there is reasonable cause 
to believe that the specific 'things' to be 
searched for and seized are located on the 
property to which entry is sought." ^ ^ A 
warrant will not be overturned if this 
probable cause is apparent.2^ Moreover, 
this Court has consistently held that "it is 
axiomatic that there be a nexus between the 
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items which are sought and the place in 
which the police wish to search for them ." 
FN27 
FN24. Dorset 16\ A.2d at 811; see 
also Carter v. State, 418 A.2d 989, 
992 (Del. 1980): Edwards, 320 A.2d 
at 703; Wilson, 314 A.2d at 906-907. 
FN25. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 
436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978) (citing 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132(1925)). 
FN26. Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 
203 (Del. 1980) (citing Brinemr v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 
(1949)). 
FN27. State v. Jones, 2000 WL 
33114361 (Del.Super.) (citing 
Dorsey, 761 A.2d at 811); Hooks, 
416 A.2d at 203; Pierson, 338 A.2d 
at 573. 
Defendant concedes in his motion "that 
putting aside other alleged constitutional 
infirmities, there was probable cause to 
arrest and search. That fact does not, 
however, justify a search of the Gray 
Avenue residence." In support of this 
contention, Defendant relies on the holding 
in State v. JonesP^ In Jones, this Court 
held that the affidavit, which supported the 
search warrant of the defendants' residence, 
lacked the requisite showing of probable 
cause. As a result, the evidence seized at the 
defendants' residence was suppressed.-^^ 
But Jones can be distinguished from the 
case at bar because the objects to be sought, 
as specified in the affidavit in Jones, 
included employee payrolls, paperwork 
relating to defendants' employees, and 
business records located at the defendants' 
place of business and residence. A search of 
defendants' residence instead produced 
cocaine and handguns. There was no direct 
evidence on the face of the affidavit that the 
police had probable cause to believe that 
cocaine and handguns would be found at 
defendants' residence. In contrast, based on 
the information in the affidavit provided by 
Detectives Jordan, Cuadrado and Janvier, 
there was ample probable cause for the 
police to believe drugs, contraband, and 
associated drug trafficking paraphernalia 
would be found at 6 S. Gray Avenue. Thus, 
there was a logical connection between the 
items sought and the premises searched. 
FN28. State v. Jones, 1997 WL 
528274 (Del.Super.). 
FN29. Id at*4. 
*6 Defendant similarly relies upon State v. 
Ada, which he purports factually bears the 
greatest similarity to his case . 2 ^ In Ada, 
the defendant maintained two separate 
residences, Apartment C-4, 3501 Lancaster 
Avenue and 2724 West 4th Street. Although 
police surveillance, a controlled drug buy, 
and exigent circumstances substantiated a 
warrantless search of the Apartment C-4 
residence, the Court held that there were 
insufficient facts set forth in the affidavit of 
probable cause to form a nexus between the 
items sought and the West 4th Street 
residence.2^1 The defendant was observed 
coming and going from the West 4th Street 
residence and using a key to enter and lock 
the front door. Yet, the police observed no 
illegal or suspicious activity occurring at the 
residence.^^- No other objective evidence 
existed to link the defendant to this 
residence.2^ 
FN30. State v. Ada, 2001 WL 
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660227 (Del.Super.). 
FN31.Mat*5. 
a concerned citizen, rather than from a past 
proven and reliable informant as in this 
instance.1^ 
FN32. Id 
FN33.Hat*4. 
The objective evidence linking the 
Defendant to 6 S. Gray Avenue in this case 
was far more substantial than in Jones and 
Ada. During the last week of March 2001, 
police surveillance revealed Defendant 
leaving this residence with an unknown 
black male and traveling to a restaurant to 
conduct what appeared to be a drug 
transaction. Additionally, police had 
observed Defendant's Lexus and a pickup 
truck on several occasions parked at 6 S. 
Gray Avenue as well as at 1725 W. 2nd 
Street. Police monitored Defendant traveling 
at different times in both vehicles to and 
from these two residences. The police could 
reasonably have concluded based on 
information provided in the affidavit, that 
Defendant was living at 6 S. Gray Avenue 
and storing his drugs at 1725 W. 2nd Street. 
Based upon the trips to and from the 
residences observed by police, the likelihood 
was great that drugs and associated 
paraphernalia would be uncovered at both 
addresses. In Ada, the contested search 
warrant was executed at West 4th Street, 
believed to be the defendant's stash house, 
not his residence. Here, the search 
performed at 6 S. Gray was the Defendant's 
residence. The information contained in the 
four corners of the Ada affidavit pertaining 
to the officers' experience with regard to 
drugs being kept in the home was not 
applicable to the West 4th Street stash house. 
The facts set forth in the search warrant 
affidavit in this case were specific with 
respect to the items sought at 6 S. Gray 
Avenue. Also, the tip in Ada originated from 
FN34.7#at*L 
Adopting the common sense interpretation 
laid down by the Delaware Supreme Court, 
the Court has reviewed the four corners of 
the search warrant affidavit in this case and 
finds that the factual circumstances and 
information contained therein were 
sufficient to warrant the police officers to 
believe that drugs, drug paraphernalia, and 
contraband would be found at 6 S. Gray 
Avenue. Upon examination of the factual 
adequacy of the affidavit as a whole, and not 
in terms of its isolated component 
allegations, sufficient probable cause exists 
to establish a nexus between the items that 
were sought and Defendant's residence due 
to the following factors: 1) a past proven and 
reliable informant contacted police that a 
black male known as "Ky" was selling large 
amounts of marijuana from 1725 W. 2nd 
Street; 2) Defendant and an unidentified 
male were observed leaving 1725 W. 2nd 
Street, traveling to 6 S. Gray Avenue, 
whereupon Defendant checked his mail, 
entered, then exited the residence and drove 
to Up The Creek Restaurant to conduct a 
probable drug sale; 3) Defendant's Lexus 
and pickup truck were observed parked at 
1725 W. 2nd Street and 6 S. Gray Avenue on 
a daily basis; 4) Defendant was observed 
traveling from 6 S. Gray Avenue to 1725 W. 
2nd leading police to believe that he was 
using 6 S. Gray Avenue as a residence and 
1725 W. 2nd as a stash house for his drugs; 
5) Defendant was observed leaving 6 S. 
Gray Avenue, traveling to and entering 1725 
W. 2n Street with empty duffel bags, and 
exiting with full bags; 6) the affiants' 
statement that, based on their training, 
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experience, and participation in other drug 
investigations, it is common for drug 
traffickers to secrete contraband, proceeds of 
drug sales and records of drug transactions 
in secure locations within their residence 
and/or businesses for their ready access and 
to conceal the same from law enforcement 
officers; and 7) the affiants' statement that 
drug traffickers only transport enough drugs 
that they will need for a sale and generally 
maintain the rest of their drugs at a secured 
location, including, but not limited to, their 
residence. 
*7 Within the parameters of the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I $ 6 of the 
Delaware Constitution, there is a 
fundamental distinction between probable 
cause to arrest and probable cause to search. 
Probable cause to arrest concerns a "person" 
and whether a criminal act has been 
committed or is being committed by a 
person to be arrested. Probable cause to 
search involves a "place" and whether 
evidence or illegal instrumentalities will be 
discovered in a particular location. In United 
States v. Whitner, the Third Circuit upheld 
the contention embedded in the Fourth 
Amendment that "probable cause to arrest 
does not automatically provide probable 
cause to search the arrestee's home." FN35 In 
United States v. Jones, the Third Circuit 
stated, however, "although probable cause to 
arrest does not automatically provide 
probable cause to search the defendant's 
home, the fact that probable cause to arrest 
has been established increases the 
probability that the defendant is storing 
evidence of that crime in the defendant's 
residence." ^ ^ By Defendant's own 
admission in his motion, there was probable 
cause to arrest. Based on the outcome of 
police surveillance efforts in the months of 
March and April, 2001, and the evidence 
obtained upon Defendant's arrest detailed in 
the affidavit, law enforcement officials 
could reasonably believe that drugs were 
being stored at 6 S. Gray Avenue. 
FN35. United States v. Whitney 219 
F.3d 289, 297 (3rd Cir.2000) 
(quoting United States v. Jones, 994 
F.2d 1051. 1055 (3rd Cir.1993): 
Dorset 761 A.2dat812. 
FN36. United States v. Jones. 994 
F.2d at 1055-56. 
In consideration of the information supplied 
by the past proven and reliable informant as 
to drug dealing from 1725 W. 2nd Street, the 
affiants' personal observations of the 
Defendant, and the experience of the police 
officers fully enumerated in the affidavit, the 
Court finds that the issuing judicial officer 
possessed sufficient grounds to reasonably 
believe that the items listed in the search 
warrant would be found at 6 S. Gray 
Avenue. In State v. Jones, this Court 
affirmed that, "[DJirect evidence that items 
will be present at the premises to be 
searched pursuant to the warrant is not 
always required in a search warrant." ^ ^ 
The lack of "direct evidence," e.g., a 
controlled drug purchase made from 6 S. 
Gray Avenue and/or an informant's tip that 
the Defendant maintained or sold drugs from 
6 S. Gray Avenue, within the four corners of 
the search warrant, to suggest that drugs or 
contraband could be seized at 6 S. Gray 
Avenue, does not negate the adequacy of a 
finding of probable cause. Defendant's 
conduct leading up to his arrest and 
possession of large quantities of marijuana 
upon his arrest provided police with more 
than mere fodder or suspicion that the 
Defendant stored contraband or drugs in his 
residence at 6 S. Gray Avenue. 
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FN37. Jones. 1997 WL 528274, at 
H (quoting Hooks, 416 A.2d at 203); 
United States v. Maestas, 546 F.2d 
1177, 1180 (5th Cir. 1977). 
In State v. Jones, the defendant similarly 
argued that the four corners of the search 
warrant lacked probable cause to support a 
belief that marijuana would be found at his 
residence, and that it was mere speculation 
that the police thought that defendant kept 
contraband or drugs in his residence. ^^ In 
support of his allegation, defendant stressed 
the fact there were no controlled buys from 
the residence, no surveillance of the 
residence, and no informant who told police 
that defendant kept drugs in his residence . 
^ ^ The Jones Court found probable cause 
existed even in the absence of the above 
three elements.^^ In the case at bar, while 
there were no controlled buys or information 
provided by an informant, information 
obtained through law enforcement 
surveillance efforts, coupled with other 
specific facts provided in the affidavit, 
established the requisite nexus between the 
items sought and the Defendant's residence. 
FN38. State v. Jones, 2000 WL 
33114361, at *2 (Del.Super.). 
FN39. Id. 
FN40. Id at *4 (emphasis added). 
*8 Moreover, in Jones, this Court held that 
"a police officer's training and experience 
may be taken into consideration in 
determining probable cause when combined 
with other factors." ^ ^ In addition to the 
factual items previously discussed, the 
affidavit contained significant information 
attesting to the affiants' experience and 
training in drug investigations, further 
substantiating the Court's finding of 
sufficient probable cause. 
FN41. Id. (emphasis added). 
The recent Fourth Circuit case of United 
States v. Hargis, significantly mirrors the 
circumstances surrounding Defendant's 
claim of insufficient probable cause.^^ In 
Hargis, the defendant asserted that the 
warrant was facially invalid because it 
lacked the necessary probable cause, having 
omitted any evidence of a nexus between 
defendant's drug trafficking and his 
residence.^^ Despite his assertion, the 
Court held that the affidavit did provide 
strong support for probable cause to search 
Defendant's residence. ^ ^ The affidavit 
contained reliable information that: 1) the 
defendant brought drugs to the location of 
his drug dealing in his car from another 
location; 2) the defendant was observed on 
several occasions going back and forth 
between his residence and the location of his 
drug dealing; and 3) the police officer stated 
that, based on his training and experience, 
street-level dealers frequently store drugs in 
their homes.^^ In this case, the same 
factual elements, and perhaps more, were 
present to implicate 6 S. Gray Avenue in 
Defendant's drug trafficking enterprise. 
FN42. United States v. Harzis, 2002 
WL 1336658 (4th Cir.(Md.)). 
FN43.M at*l . 
FN44. Id 
FN45. Id 
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing facts and statements 
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contained within the four corners of the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant 
and the fact that probable cause existed to 
arrest Defendant, this Court finds sufficient 
probable cause was established to execute a 
valid search of 6 S. Gray Avenue. 
Accordingly, there are sufficient specific 
facts set forth in the affidavit to form a 
nexus between the items that were sought 
and Defendant's residence. 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
challenged search and seizure violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights. For all the 
foregoing reasons, Defendant's Consolidated 
Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Del.Super.,2002. 
State v. Church 
Not Reported in A.2d, 2002 WL 31840887 
(Del.Super.) 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for 
Official Publication) 
BENCH. 
*1 Inventory searches are a well recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment. See State v. Hygh 711 
P.2d 264, 267-68 (Utah 1985) (citing South 
Dakota v. Ovverman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 
3092 (1976)). "In order to support a finding 
that a valid inventory search has taken place, 
the court must first determine whether there 
was reasonable and proper justification for 
the impoundment of the vehicle." Id. at 268. 
The State must also show " 'that there exists 
an established reasonable procedure for 
safeguarding impounded vehicles and their 
contents and that the challenged police 
activity was essentially in conformance with 
that procedure.' " Id. at 269 (quoting 2 
Wayne H. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 7.4 
at 576-77 (1978)). 
Defendant concedes that his vehicle was 
justifiably impounded. He argues, however, 
that the trial court erred in finding the 
inventory search valid because the State 
failed to meet its burden to establish that a 
standardized procedure for inventory 
searches existed and that the officer 
complied with the procedure when 
conducting the search of defendant's vehicle. 
Specifically, defendant argues that the best 
evidence rule. Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, requires the State to introduce 
the actual written policy at the suppression 
hearing. We disagree. The best evidence rule 
does not apply because the determination as 
to the admissibility of the gun was not made 
at trial, but rather was made at a pretrial 
suppression hearing, where the rules of 
evidence do not apply. See Utah R.Evid. 
1 lOUbYl) and Utah R.Evid. 104(a). m 
FN1. A defendant who wishes to 
make an evidentiary challenge, such 
as a best evidence objection under 
Rule 1002, must proceed to trial and 
make the evidentiary challenge there. 
Even if the best evidence rule did apply, the 
State is not bound to "submit written 
procedures in order to carry its burden of 
showing that its agents acted in accordance 
with standardized procedures when 
performing an inventory search of an 
impounded automobile." State v. Stricklinz 
844 P.2d 979, 989 (Utah Ct.App.1992). In 
Strickling, as in the instant case, evidence 
regarding the procedures for inventory 
searches came solely from the testimony of 
the searching officer at a pretrial suppression 
hearing. Id at 988. The testimony of the 
officer in the instant case, like the testimony 
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of the officer in Strickling, was sufficient to 
establish the existence of, and compliance 
with, standardized procedures. Additionally, 
defendant's contention that the inventory 
search was invalid because the officer failed 
to complete it himself is without merit. The 
fact that the first officer did not complete the 
search himself is unimportant because the 
record reflects that a second officer 
completed it. 
Defendant next argues that the trial court 
erred in finding the inventory search valid 
because it was conducted as a pretext to an 
investigative motive. We again disagree. 
The law allows an officer to impound a 
vehicle "with registration that has been 
expired for more than three months." Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-la-110iqyf)(T) (1998). 
The officer in this case testified that he 
routinely impounds when a vehicle is well 
past the required time for registration, as 
defendant's vehicle was in this case. In 
Strickling, the court determined that the 
State produced the necessary threshold 
evidence when the impounding officer 
testified that he impounds sixty to seventy-
five percent of the vehicles he stops for 
expired plate registrations. See Strickling, 
844 P.2d at 987. The court then stated that 
u[t]he determinative evidence here is what 
the officer actually did, without regard to his 
motives in a particular case, when 
confronted with registration violations." Id. 
The uncontroverted testimony of the officer 
in the instant case is that he impounds 
ninety-nine percent of the vehicles he stops 
when plate registration expired nine months 
earlier. Moreover, in addition to the long 
expired registration, defendant could not 
provide proof of insurance, further 
demonstrating that impoundment was 
proper. Upon properly impounding the 
vehicle, an inventory search was required. 
*2 The long expired registration and the 
defendant's inability to provide proof of 
insurance, coupled with the officer's stated 
impoundment practices, demonstrate that the 
officer properly conducted the inventory 
search in accordance with established policy 
and procedure. Therefore, even assuming 
the continued viability of the pretext 
doctrine in inventory search cases, there was 
no pretext in this case.— 
FN2. Compare State v. Hvzh 711 
P.2d at 268 (stating the inventory 
exception does not apply when the 
inventory is merely a pretext) with 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1138 
(Utah 1994) (rejecting the pretext 
doctrine in traffic stops). 
We see no reason to disturb the trial court's 
determination that the inventory search of 
defendant's vehicle was valid. Accordingly, 
we affirm the trial court's refusal to suppress 
the evidence and defendant's resulting 
conviction. 
GREENWOOD, A.P.J., and DAVIS, J., 
concur. 
Utah App., 1999. 
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